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Abstract
Ongoing efforts by state actors to collaborate on addressing the challenges of global cybersecurity have been slow to yield
results. Technical expert communities such as Computer Security and Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) have played a funda-
mental role in maintaining the Internet’s functional structure through transnational collaboration. Responsible for security
incident management and located in diverse constituencies, these coordination centres engage in joint responses and solve
day-to-day cybersecurity problems through diverse national, regional and international networks. This article argues that
CSIRTs form an epistemic community that engages in science diplomacy, at times navigating geopolitical tensions in a way
that political actors are not able to. Through interviews with CSIRT representatives, we explain how their collaborative actions,
rooted in shared technical knowledge, norms and best practices, contribute to the advancement of international cooperation
on cybersecurity.
Despite almost three decades of diplomatic efforts, cross-sec-
tor collaboration and academic attention, international coop-
eration on the global governance of cybersecurity has been
slow and uncertain (Carr, 2016a; Petratos, 2014). Successful
state-driven diplomatic endeavours continue to be limited,
and many existing efforts are overshadowed or undermined
by conﬂicting national interests, reciprocal distrust, and/or
geopolitical disputes that spill over from other issue areas. Per-
haps the single exception is the Council of Europe Convention
on Cybercrime (also known as the Budapest Convention1).
However, the Convention focuses speciﬁcally on harmonising
national legal frameworks in order to facilitate law enforce-
ment cooperation rather than broader, systemic factors such
as the challenge of attribution (Carr, 2017). In short, govern-
ments have struggled to gain traction on substantive coopera-
tive efforts to address global cyber(in)security.
While we see conventional geopolitics largely reconstituted
in the political arena of international cybersecurity negotia-
tions, there is a community of non-state actors that provide
essential security services and do so largely free of such con-
straints. In this article, we focus on those who work on cyber-
security incident response, known as Computer Emergency
Response Teams (CERTs) or Cyber Security Incident Response
Teams (CSIRTs). Speciﬁcally, we emphasise their role as epis-
temic communities that, through shared technical expertise,
norms and best practices, have established knowledge-based
networks that support international coordination in cyberse-
curity (Haas, 1992; Kaltofen and Acuto, 2018a; in this issue).
This allows CSIRTs to maintain the integrity of the Internet’s
infrastructure at the domestic and transnational level.
Through an investigation of the history and practices of
CSIRTs, we argue that these networks engage in science
diplomacy, which describes how scientiﬁc research and tech-
nical activities can play a part in fostering positive interna-
tional relations and cooperation (The Royal Society, 2010).
In addition to desk-based research that brings together lit-
erature on international cybersecurity, epistemic communi-
ties, and science diplomacy, we actively engaged with the
incident response team community. We interviewed a self-
selected sample of nine CSIRT and Product Security Incident
Response Team (PSIRT) members and also attended an inter-
national technical incident response colloquium where we
were able to engage in informal, unstructured discussions.
The interview sample comprises participants from North and
Latin America, Europe and Asia-Paciﬁc. Participants were
enlisted through recruitment emails and snowball sampling.
The semi-structured interviews were conducted in March and
April 2017, either in German or English as well as face-to-face
or digitally using Voice over Internet Protocol services. In the
course of the interviews, participants were asked to discuss
their viewpoints on the role of CSIRTs in the international
cybersecurity context, their collaboration and information
sharing practices and potential barriers for cooperation. This
work informed our understanding of CSIRTs’ role in support-
ing and advancing science diplomacy in cybersecurity and
enabled us to illustrate the real-life application of the diplo-
matic effects of their actions.2
It should be noted that the term CSIRT complements the
registered trademark ‘CERT’, which requires teams to be
authorised by Carnegie Mellon to adopt it (CERT/CC, 2017).
Both CERT and CSIRT are used interchangeably to describe
incident response teams, but in this article, we use the term
CSIRT to represent the full range of formations (which
includes PSIRTs) currently available.
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Technical expert communities and the Internet
Technical expert communities have played a lead role in the
Internet’s functional structure and coordination from the
inception of the Internet. Indeed, ARPANET, the predecessor
of the current Internet, was largely developed within univer-
sities and its architectural foundations and protocols were
established and agreed by the researchers and developers
working in those higher education and private sector institu-
tions (Leiner et al., 2009).
Since then, much of the Internet’s coordination and espe-
cially the actions taken to ensure its security, continue to be
coordinated from within specialised expert groups. These
range from the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) to
standards-development organisations such as the Institute
of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE). This ‘broad com-
munity of Internauts’ (Leiner et al., 2009, p. 23) comprised of
computer scientists, physicists and many other technicians,
was not only essential to the original design of the Internet,
but also continues to play a central role in many of the pro-
cesses and practices that constitute the Internet’s gover-
nance (Raymond and DeNardis, 2015). This observation
speaks to the overarching objective of this special issue: to
showcase that science diplomacy can be achieved by a
diverse set of actors who engage in collaborative practices
rooted in technical and scientiﬁc expertise that are ulti-
mately ‘diplomatic in their quality and/or effect (unantici-
pated and unintended as well as intended)’ (Kaltofen and
Acuto, 2018b, in this issue).
Internet security is a global concern with deep and wide-
ranging social, political and economic implications. Due to
the inherent technical nature, it is ill-suited for governance
through solely political or diplomatic channels (Dean and
McDermott, 2017). CSIRTs provide, therefore, a useful case
for the analysis of science diplomacy in global cybersecurity
governance. These response centres and the networks that
they build are responsible for global security incident man-
agement and are essentially a backbone of today’s digital
infrastructure.
Background to CSIRTs
CSIRTs were introduced to respond to security shortfalls in
the original design of the Internet (Lipson, 2002). The Morris
Worm, the ﬁrst large-scale computer incident of its kind,
incentivised authorities in the US to establish a central
organisation which could coordinate and react to such inse-
curities. Launched from an MIT computer by graduate stu-
dent Robert Tappan Morris, the worm affected machines
and networks all over the world (Kelty, 2011). Internet hosts
struggled to coordinate its containment. While the existing
information exchange between network operators was
good, they faced the problem that their communication was
itself entirely dependent on the Internet and email. When
those systems were out of action, individuals and organisa-
tions had no alternative way to contact one another to
coordinate a response.
Recognising this fundamental vulnerability, a meeting was
convened to discuss ways to improve future incident man-
agement. The recommendations arising from that gathering
included a call for a single point of contact to be estab-
lished for Internet security problems. This organisation
would act as a trusted clearinghouse for security informa-
tion. It would hold a list of alternative contact points, such
as phone numbers, to communicate between different
stakeholders and would facilitate the incident response
through quick and effective communication channels and
awareness programmes (West-Brown et al., 2003). This
resulted in the establishment of the ﬁrst CERT, CERT/CC
(Coordination Centre), at the Carnegie Mellon Software Engi-
neering Institute. It was commissioned by the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) – a branch of
the US Department of Defense – and operated under a US
government contract (Maurer et al., 2015a).
The concept of incident response teams gradually
expanded and led to a growth of this expert culture (Lipson,
2002). CSIRTs have since moved beyond their initial aca-
demic realm and can be found in a range of sectors where
they provide services for a particular constituency (West-
Brown et al., 2003). These constituencies range from public
and private organisations (e.g. universities, ﬁnancial service
providers), governments to those known as PSIRTs that
manage security vulnerabilities related to particular products
and services. While PSIRTs ‘look at all security vulnerabilities
in products and services’ (P1, interview 31 March) that can
affect customers, CSIRTs in an organisation generally ‘handle
the infrastructure’ (P1, interview 31 March) inside a network.
Thus, an organisation might have both an internal CSIRT as
well as a PSIRT, which mutually focus on security vulnerabili-
ties within a constituency, but do so from different angles.
In addition to these localised formations and as a conse-
quence of the Internet’s elevation to a global infrastructure,
CSIRTs developed regional and international networks. These
range from the Task Force on Computer Security Incident
Response Teams (TF-CSIRT) which encourages collaboration
and coordination between CSIRTs in Europe, to the Asia
Paciﬁc Computer Emergency Response Team (APCERT). In
addition to regional networks, there is also a global network
called Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams
(FIRST). The establishment of these cross-border structures
speaks to the inherent transnational nature of cybersecurity
threats. Incidents are not conﬁned to state boundaries
rather they demand highly internationalised responses.
Security incidents on one side of the world affect teams on
the other which explains CSIRTs intrinsic interdependence.
One interviewee commented that ‘we are simply damned to
work together’ (P2, interview 7 March).
Increasingly, CSIRTs’ expertise and competence has been
recognised by and incorporated into diplomatic endeavours.
The United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Devel-
opments in Information and Telecommunications in the Con-
text of International Security (UN GGE) released a consensus
report containing 11 proposed ‘cyber norms’ for responsible
state behaviour in cyberspace. One of these proposed norms
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explicitly refers to the CSIRT community, suggesting that ‘[s]-
tates should not conduct or knowingly support activity to
harm the information systems of the authorized emergency
response teams (sometimes known as CERTs or cybersecurity
incident response teams) of another [s]tate’ (UN GGE, 2015, p.
8). Furthermore, ‘a [s]tate should not use authorized emer-
gency response teams to engage in malicious international
activity’ (UN GGE, 2015, p. 8). The role of CSIRTs is now also
formalised in supranational legislation, such as the EU NIS
Directive (European Commission, 2018) where teams help
ensure the security of network and information systems for
essential services within the Union.
It is important to note that CSIRTs’ actions, which are out-
lined in more depth below, also allow them to respond to a
gap in international policy cooperation in cybersecurity, a
realm of quintessential diplomatic relevance. Their practices,
shared set of norms and actions resemble Haas’s (1992) the-
sis about epistemic communities in that CSIRTs work on a
particular issue-area and have agency to develop normative
ideas and processes which shape as well as inﬂuence out-
comes, which are in this case of technical nature.
CSIRTs – epistemic communities in international
cybersecurity
CSIRTs are distinct from many other similar expert networks
in that they provide security directly. Rather than lobbying
for a global ‘culture of security’ as we see in the domains of
nuclear and human security, CSIRTs coordinate joint
responses and solve day-to-day cybersecurity problems
through diverse national, regional and international net-
works without relying on states to act. Although CSIRTs do
not participate in high-level interstate negotiation, they do
engage in technical knowledge exchange with their actions
contributing to a diplomatic understanding of collaboration
that moves beyond political disputes. Thus, the following
section illustrates how, in the absence of a global legally
binding treaty on cybersecurity, CSIRTs provide a framework
for international cooperation.
In spite of their wide radius of operations, stretching from
national infrastructure protection to product security inci-
dent response (Huber et al., 2016), CSIRTs’ maintain a uni-
versal goal to promote cybersecurity through collaborative
action (Finnemore and Hollis, 2016). This unifying objective
is a key indicator that these geographically and sectorial
diverse teams, indeed, form an epistemic community. CSIRTs
communicate and collaborate with one another and they
collectively respond to incidents like new malware, discov-
ered vulnerabilities or targeted attacks. Incident response
teams can be established both within state infrastructures
(including law enforcement or the intelligence communities)
as well as in private organisations (Bronk et al., 2006). CSIRTs
consequently not only speak to the public-private partner-
ship that underpins the Internet (Carr, 2016b; Christou and
Simpson, 2006), but embody the idea of science diplomacy
through a self-organised professional culture with estab-
lished information-sharing and monitoring practices, and
recognised rules of engagement.
For CSIRTs, their cross-border, needs-derived formation
characterises their actions (Bada et al., 2014). CSIRTs are not
only active when incidents such as network disruptions
occur, but also they continuously work on preventing, moni-
toring and recovering from incidents. Bada et al. (2014)
identiﬁed four categories of CSIRTs’ services: (1) reactive,
based on incident handling,3 support and coordination; (2)
proactive, based on technology watch and maintenance of
security; (3) artefact handling, based on digital forensics; and
(4) security quality management, based on training for risk
analysis, business continuity and disaster recovery.4
As a result of these incident management capabilities,
some equate CSIRTs to a ﬁre brigade, equipped and ready
to mobilise in case of emergencies (Caldwell, 2014; ENISA,
2008; West-Brown et al., 2003). Klimburg and Zylberberg
(2015, p. 27) consider this description as perhaps too mod-
est. In their view, CSIRTs are more ‘akin to insurance, build-
ing-code supervisors and law enforcement investigators’.
Whether ﬁre ﬁghters or insurers, the consolidated nature of
these communities of practice is foundational for their
actions in international coordination on cybersecurity. CSIRTs
mobilise technical expertise to cooperate on cybersecurity
and consequently establish channels of communication to
tackle transboundary security threats.
While we acknowledge the view of some who stress that
the CSIRT ‘model cannot be over-idealised or over-differen-
tiated from the political side’ (P4, interview 12 April), CSIRTs’
role in the international governance of cybersecurity does
deserve recognition. Their function and operation raise
questions about where diplomacy happens and what consti-
tutes a diplomatic actor in this context. Teams have been
working across geographic, cultural and political borders to
collaborate on highly sensitive issues for the last 30 years. In
many instances, their establishment is based on a ‘model
that is community-based, bottom-up, inclusive’ (P4, inter-
view 12 April); although this is – due to the rise of interac-
tions with law enforcement and security agencies–currently
transforming (Maurer et al., 2015b).
CSIRTs’ efﬁcacy in responding to incidents has been
linked to their ‘quasi diplomatic capability’ (Sam Maccherola,
cited in: Caldwell, 2014, p. 7). This capacity is largely based
on the individuals’ formal and informal professional relation-
ships and it is central to the development of mechanisms
for information sharing. In particular, the regional and inter-
national networks are helpful when CSIRTs ‘are not able to
reach out to certain people in certain places’ (P5, interview
12 April) which further illustrates the cooperative element
that characterises these communities. Regional and interna-
tional CSIRT networks assist the liaison between teams and
external bodies. They also facilitate ‘capacity building’ (P4,
interview 12 April) through conferences, trainings, events
and coordinated exercises. Through these public develop-
mental practices, where CSIRTs engage with other teams
beyond national boundaries, CSIRTs are not simply sharing
technical knowledge and exchanging information. They are
furthering their global expert culture and carry out impor-
tant community building processes. They provide support to
other units in less developed regions but also have to
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manage, just as political actors do, ‘cultural and political dif-
ferences’ (P7, interview 28 April). For instance, one partici-
pant said that the establishment of a particular regional
CSIRT turned out to be quite difﬁcult, because it would have
been hard ‘to get them [other CSIRTs] into a room. It took
years and years to negotiate on a regional level for the
establishment of [X]’ (P4, interview 12 April). CSIRTs conse-
quently try to identify ‘overlaps’ (P8, interview 28 April)
between teams and their objectives, and use a range of
mediation strategies, allowing them to achieve effective inci-
dent response.
The extent to which CSIRTs have to navigate political
divides while pursuing the goals of collective action in
transnational cybersecurity further illustrates their value as
an example of science diplomacy. Their extensive networks
are a model for a decentralised, self-organised community
that reinforces the complex relationship linking diplomacy
with scientiﬁc and technical endeavours. Their authority and
status in the international system lies not in traditional
forms and notions of power, but expert knowledge and
experience.
CSIRTs also move beyond incident response by agreeing
on shared best practices and baseline communication proto-
cols. This ensures that Internet security is embedded in their
educational exercises that set a framework for international
cooperation between different actors. For example, the
regional CSIRT representation body APCERT conducts an
annual drill to test the response and cooperation mecha-
nisms of CSIRTs within the Asia Paciﬁc region (APCERT,
2014). During such exercises, CSIRTs need to interact
between both local and international partners and coordi-
nate across different boundaries. The latter reﬂects the
strong collaborative element of CSIRTs work and validates
the enhanced communication protocols, technical capabili-
ties and quality of incident responses that CSIRTs foster. In
order for such exercises to work, the communication
exchange through ‘mailing lists’ (P9, interview 29 April) or
‘encrypted email’ (P1, interview 31 March) must be well
established and in line with pre-agreed ‘standard formats’
(P9, interview 29 April).
In addition to these horizontal communication channels
between CSIRTs, vertical cooperation with various cybersecu-
rity stakeholders at the national and transnational level are
also critical for their activities. CSIRTs practices reﬂect Haas’s
(1992, p. 3) premise that epistemic communities support a
‘common policy enterprise’ while maintaining a ‘shared set
of normative and principled beliefs’. Interviewees mentioned
that their ‘work is very international’ (P2, interview 7 March),
that they ‘collaborate with other companies – even competi-
tors’ (P1, interview 31 March), and engage with external
bodies such as ‘ISPs’ (P2, interview 7 March), the ‘ITU’ (P8,
interview 28 April; P9, interview 29 April) or the ‘OAS
[Organisation of American States]’ (P9, interview 29 April). In
fact, participants argue that due to the global architecture
of the Internet, one does ‘not really have an option not to
engage with other parties outside of your organisation, such
as . . . the network operators, another CERT or a law enforce-
ment agency’ (P5, interview 12 April).
This cooperation also occurs with actors that political
players generally struggle to cooperate with. Interviewees
emphasised the value of collaborating with teams who may
be afﬁliated with or operating in countries or organisations
considered hostile by some policy makers including, ‘Irani-
ans or Russians’ (P2, interview 7 March) or ‘China’ (P8, inter-
view 28 April). Because cybersecurity incidents are so
interconnected and will ultimately spread across the net-
work, CSIRT community accepts that it is better to collabo-
rate rather than operate in isolation. CSIRTs consequently
prefer to have actors of all national and organisational back-
grounds ‘on board’ (P7, interview 28 April) and to have
those networks readily available whenever needed. How-
ever, interviewees also accept that this cooperation has its
limitations. For instance, there would be ‘certain things you
simply do not ask’ (P7, interview 28 April) particular CSIRTs
due to the delicate nature of cultural differences or larger
political disputes. These sensitivities do not prevent them
from working with these particular CSIRTs on issues of
mutual interest and illustrates their diplomatic qualities
(Sam Maccherola, cited in Caldwell, 2014).
This viewpoint and CSIRTs’ mediated engagement with
both public and private parties highlight the diplomatic nat-
ure of their actions. Essentially, not only they work collabo-
ratively to achieve a particular goal through an awareness of
differences, but also through the safety of acting upon a
particular ‘needs basis’ (P5, interview 12 April). This focus on
common needs may ultimately be the reason for CSIRTs’
cooperative capacity and an explanation for science diplo-
macy’s success in matters of cybersecurity. While political
actors have to take into consideration factors such as equity,
ethics, legislation, economy, the balance of power, political
conﬂict and political distrust, CSIRTs proﬁt from precisely
this ability to ignore or at least partially suppress the politi-
cal dimensions of their actions. This is not to say that CSIRTs
are negligent in disregarding the political nature of their
work. Instead, CSIRTs cooperation efforts proﬁt from these
technical actors’ ability to draw on and work within a frame-
work of shared technical objectives.
The collaboration of CSIRTs is, thus, based on a ‘common
understanding between individuals and organisations in this
community’ (P5, interview 12 April). There is a collective
cognition evident, with the value of their action contributing
to a greater public good and security for society. One partic-
ipant highlighted this communal element, emphasising that
CSIRTs share ‘information about our procedures, our tools,
our methods and experiences’ (P6, interview 21 April) to
jointly, and through best practices, contribute to the security
of the Internet which is an expression of how a non-govern-
mental actor can foster both state and non-state objectives
and strengthen partnerships based on agreed norms. This
can be seen in CSIRTs’ standardised information exchange
format. The Trafﬁc Light Protocol (TLP) (FIRST, 2016a) is a
colour coding system to ensure that sensitive information is
distributed in accordance with agreed expectations (US-
CERT, 2017). While TLP white information may be forwarded
without restrictions, TLP red implies that information is not
for disclosure and may not be shared with any parties
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outside of the speciﬁc realm in which it was originally dis-
closed. The TLP was created in order to facilitate greater
sharing of information between teams and although not
mandatory, most teams adhere to it.
The usage of such measures illustrates how informal
norms and trust are fundamental factors in successful CSIRT
operations. They frequently compensate for a lack of formal
links or structures. In particular, trust is a factor that has
been identiﬁed (Huber et al., 2016; Maurer et al., 2015a) as
an element that characterises not only CSIRTs but also
other technical expert groups including the original found-
ing parties of the Internet (Leiner et al., 2009; Meier-Hahn,
2015). It is a feature that derives from the Internet and the
‘Internauts’ (Leiner et al., 2009, p. 23) scientiﬁc ethos and
expert nature, and can, together with the actions of CSIRTs
regional and international networks support other, more
formal processes of cooperation and behaviours in global
cybersecurity.
Conclusions
This analysis highlighted how the evolution of collective
action in transnational cybersecurity was founded on the
actions of expert communities which established collabora-
tive governance mechanisms independently of state-driven
international agreements. In line with the conceptual frame-
work of this special issue, we have demonstrated how
CSIRTs are a powerful example of the extent to which tech-
nical epistemic communities support and contribute to the
achievement of international cooperation in cybersecurity.
Their diplomacy is ‘about technical people trying to solve
technical problems to the best of their capacities and
through trusted networks’ (P3, interview 12 April). This dis-
tinct focus helps them to respond to incidents and develop
best practices in a way that political actors struggle with.
Thus, CSIRTs are ﬁlling a gap in international cooperation
on cybersecurity, mobilising their expertise and overcoming
disparities.
CSIRTs form an epistemic community that contributes to
international coordination in cybersecurity through their
characteristic trusted partnerships. It is perhaps unreason-
able to expect that the same trusted communities and com-
munication channels could be found in the political realm.
However, the enduring success and efﬁcacy of CSIRTs pro-
vides some valuable lessons on what might help to shape
cyber norms at the international level. A key point here is
the beneﬁts of emphasising common ground over differ-
ences when addressing global cybersecurity (Erskine and
Carr, 2017). Also important is the recognition that there is
complementarity between these communities. Collaborating
around a clearly deﬁned technical need, CSIRTs’ issue-based
actions can feed into and support other non-state and state
actors’ endeavours to solve global collective action on
cybersecurity. Their practices neither replace nor over-
shadow other diplomatic mechanisms – including those car-
ried out by state actors – but they help us to identify and
understand the subtle instances of science diplomacy that
might otherwise be overlooked.
The continued growth of connected devices and econo-
mies means that society and businesses are increasingly
dependent on the maintenance of a stable and secure Inter-
net infrastructure. Governance strategies that are therefore
adaptive and ﬂexible and allow both state as well as non-
state actors to engage in this domain are needed (Tanczer
et al., forthcoming). Analysing the importance of this techni-
cal community and the support it provides is a helpful lens
through which to examine how international cooperation
can move forward. States clearly have an ongoing and dee-
ply important role to play in global cybersecurity. However,
if policy actors are able to shift their perspectives and
modes of thinking by fostering collaboration on topics
where interest’s overlap, they will have a better chance of
meeting the demands of collaborative cybersecurity gover-
nance, rather than governments.
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1. As of September 2018, 61 states have implemented the Budapest
Convention. Yet, it remains quite contentious among some others,
often for processual reasons (Brodowski, 2016).
2. The following analysis features extracts from these interviews, with
German passages translated into English. Participants are referred to
as ‘P’ and identifying number (i.e., P1). The symbol ‘[X]’ is used to
hide words or phrases which could enable participant identiﬁcation.
3. Incident response describes all of the technical components required
to analyse and contain an incident. Incident handling describes the
logistics, communications, coordination and planning functions
needed in order to resolve an incident in a calm and efﬁcient man-
ner (de Beaupre, 2009). The latter includes preparation measures, the
identiﬁcation and detection of an attack, the containment of an
attack, as well as post-incident activities such as recovery and analy-
sis (Cichonski et al., 2012).
4. FIRST’s (2016b) Service Framework and the CSIRT Handbook by
CERT/CC (2003) would account artifact handling as part of their reac-
tive services.
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